

FUTURE WARFARE

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1991 Iraq War

• PGMs: 10%

• Stealth: <40

• Real-time communications



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Real-time communications

2003 Gulf War

- 1 RQ-4 Global Hawk 5X SatCom 1991 Gulf War
- 1 RQ 4 Global Hawk 70% of all TA
- PGMs: 100%





2022- Ukraine War

- Ubiquitous drones
- Long-range precision-artillery
- Space-based commercial Comm
- Algorithmic-based precision
- Cyber attacks
- Mass-scale disinformation



2022- Ukraine War


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
War is not changing, it's just being waged




128 YEARS OF MOORE'S LAW








CEP, a measure of accuracy, defines the radius of a circle in which 50% of a salvo's munitions fall. Since WWII, CEPs for guided munitions have fallen precipitously. The above image illustrates falling CEPs for air-dropped munitions since World War II and the increasing employment of guided munitions since the Vietnam War.






Time

Future warfare?

"The best way to predict the future is to create it."


Abraham Lincoln




Realistic trends

- more automation
- more human-enhancement
- more cyber/hybrid attacks
- more disinformation








Jevon's Paradox: "We'll spend more on what gets more productive."

Baumol Effect: "We'll spend more on what doesn't get more productive."


Luttwak's paradox: most effective defense will lead to attack elsewhere



Price (USD per million tokens)



Data source: Epoch AI, Artificial Analysis



JENSEN HUANG, PRESIDENT ANDCEO OF NVIDIA

Al for strategy, defense policy and planning. Deterrence

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- Nature of war inflicting and suffering pain is not changing: higher cost to train/retain those willing to suffer.
- Asymmetric attacks: the less decisive the battlefield, the more isolated from it our societies, the more attacks on civilians
- Socio-economic interdependence=weaponized vulnerabilities

Europe is largely unprepared

